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ASSET-BACKED COMMERCIAL PAPER
CONDUITS
MICHAEL DURRERt
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper offers an introduction to Asset-Backed Commercial
Paper (ABCP) securitization as a case study of a particular, and
widely used, type of securitization in which large and small banks
frequently participate. Securitization of any kind is a financing tech-
nique through which financial assets are converted into publicly or
privately issued securities with which the owners of those assets raise
money in the capital markets. The structural keys to securitization
are to isolate the assets and the related securities from the bank-
ruptcy risk of the assets' owner and to protect investors from the
credit risks associated with the underlying assets. What follows will
describe how these basic principles of securitization are put into prac-
tice in ABCP programs.
Asset securitization through commercial paper conduits began in
the early 1980s in order to securitize credit card receivables. The
concept expanded through the rest of the decade with conduit pro-
grams introduced by several money center banks, including
1st Chicago, Continental Bank and Security Pacific. This expansion
has continued in the 1990s and includes many conduits sponsored by
European and Japanese banks as well as several regional banks in the
United States. As of the end of 1996, roughly 160 ABCP programs
had approximately $150 billion in asset-backed commercial paper
outstanding.' In addition to the growth in size, the market for ABCP
has experienced diversification in the types of assets securitized.
Conduit programs now issue commercial paper backed by a variety
of asset classes, including trade receivables, automobile and con-
sumer loans, corporate loans, and leases. The industry is also
exploring additional asset types to securitize. Examples include 12b-
1 fees (management fees for mutual funds), tax liens and utility fees.
' Partner, Kilpatrick Stockton LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina; A.B., 1974, Duke
University; M.A., 1979, Boston College; J.D., 1987, William and Mary.
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Although not in commercial paper conduit form, the singer and
songwriter David Bowie recently raised $55 million from asset-
backed notes secured by future royalties on his songs.
The purpose of asset securitization through issuance of commer-
cial paper is to provide a flexible and economic source of funding for
financial institutions and companies that create or acquire financial
assets. ABCP, like term asset-backed securities, often offer a lower
cost of funds to an issuer than conventional bank loans or from the
sale of whole portfolios of assets. By converting credit cards receiv-
ables or trade receivables, for example, into broadly traded
commercial paper, the owner of those assets gains access to a larger
source of capital in the form of the institutional investors that partici-
pate in the commercial paper market. In addition, the credit
enhancement and liquidity provided to ABCP (as discussed below
under Credit Enhancement and Liquidity) enable issuers to obtain
funds from short-term capital markets at lower interest rates than
from other sources. Commercial paper also offers flexibility to issu-
ers with respect to the amount, timing and duration of borrowings.
Within an existing conduit program, ABCP generally can be issued
on short notice, in large or small amounts and with maturities of from
30 to 90 days. Some institutions and companies use ABCP to ware-
house mortgage loans, auto loans or leases, using ABCP to fund the
origination or acquisition of these assets until they have created a
pool large enough to sell or securitize in a term structure (that is, a
securitization in which fixed-term securities are issued have medium
to long maturities). Finally, an important aspect of asset securitiza-
tion is to remove assets from the owner's balance sheet. An ABCP
conduit can be structured to permit the transfer of assets from the
owner to the conduit entity to be treated as a sale for accounting pur-
poses.
II. STRUCTURE
ABCP conduits generally fall into one of two structures: single-
seller and multi-seller. As the terms suggest, some conduits are de-
signed to securitize the assets of a single entity, while others are a
vehicle through which a number of asset owners securitize into the
commercial paper market. The majority of all ABCP outstanding is
issued by multi-seller conduits. As a generalization, single-seller
conduits are typically used by companies or banks to securitize their
own balance sheet, e.g., a portfolio of credit cards or auto loans,
whereas large banks employ multi-seller programs to securitize the
assets of various of their customers, as in the case of trade receiv-
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ables. The following discussion will focus on a multi-seller conduit
structure (see Diagram 1), with commentary on a few significant dif-
ferences of single-seller structures.
A typical structure for a multi-seller trade receivables conduit is
as follows: A bank (the Sponsor) establishes an unaffiliated special
purpose corporate or partnership entity (the Vehicle) to acquire the
accounts receivable of several of the bank's customers and to issue
commercial paper backed by those trade receivables. The Vehicle is
usually an "orphan subsidiary" which is owned by an entity unaffili-
ated with the Sponsor. Through a management agreement with the
Vehicle, however, the Sponsor effectively directs the activities of the
Vehicle. In a management agreement, the Vehicle appoints the
Sponsor as managing agent of the Vehicle with power of attorney to
take actions on the Vehicle's behalf in return for a fee. The Vehicle
purchases receivables indirectly from each of several participating
bank customers (each, a Seller). The transfer of receivables from a
Seller to the conduit occurs in a two-step transfer, whereby the Seller
first transfers the assets on an ongoing basis to a special purpose en-
tity (an SPE), and the SPE then transfers the assets to the Vehicle.
The transfer from each Seller to its SPE is governed by a receivables
purchase agreement (a Receivables Purchase Agreement), and the
transfer from SPE to the conduit is embodied in a sale and servicing
agreement (each, a Sale and Servicing Agreement). The purpose of
the two-step transfer is to distance the assets purchased by the Vehi-
cle from a bankruptcy of the Seller. As discussed under "Legal
Issues" below, an SPE (usually a corporation, sometimes a limited
liability company) is created with provisions in its governing docu-
ments that limit the likelihood of its being placed in bankruptcy and
of being consolidated with the bankruptcy estate of its parent, the
Seller.
Each Seller sells its accounts receivable to the Vehicles on an
ongoing basis for so long as that Seller commits to participate in the
conduit program. The Seller also agrees to service (primarily col-
lecting payments) the accounts receivable for the benefit of the
Vehicle and commercial paper investors. The Vehicle pays for the
accounts receivable with the proceeds of the issuance of commercial
paper. The Vehicle typically purchases accounts receivable from the
Sellers in the form of a certificated participation interest (each, a PC)
which represents a fractional beneficial ownership interest in all ac-
counts receivable sold into a conduit. PCs are created by a Seller
pursuant to a Sale and Servicing Agreement (or similar agreement).
The Seller normally retains an interest in that portion of the trans-
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ferred receivables not required to support the PC.
Commercial paper is issued by the Vehicle pursuant to a deposi-
tary agreement (the Depositary Agreement) in discreet "tranches,"
each having its own interest rate and maturity as directed by the ap-
plicable Seller. Maturing tranches of commercial paper are repaid by
the Vehicle, in the first instance, by new issuances of commercial pa-
per. If the Vehicle cannot issue a sufficient amount of new
commercial paper to repay the maturing commercial paper on a
given day, it may apply collections on the receivables, and to the ex-
tent such collections are insufficient, the Vehicle will draw a liquidity
facility provided by a bank or group of banks for that purpose.
III. CREDIT ENHANCEMENT AND LIQUIDITY
A. Risks
A fundamental element in the design of ABCP programs is to
protect investors in the commercial paper from credit risk and li-
quidity risk associated with the assets being securitized. Credit risk is
the possibility that the obligor on an asset, for example a credit card
holder, automobile owner or an account debtor on a Seller's trade
receivables, will default on its obligation to pay the Seller. Liquidity
risk is the danger that collections on an asset will be delayed and
therefore not available when needed to pay maturing commercial
paper secured by that asset. In a bankruptcy of the Seller, the Vehi-
cle should ultimately receive collections on the assets because the
Vehicle has a first priority perfected security interest in the assets
pursuant to the Sale and Servicing Agreement. However, a bank-
ruptcy proceeding with respect to the Seller would likely delay the
payment of such collections to the Vehicle and so to the commercial
paper holders.
Two other risks associated with ABCP securitization are dilution
and preference risk. Dilution arises when the amount payable under
a receivable is reduced in ordinary course of the a Seller's business.
Examples include rebates, offsets or credits that result from disputes
between a Seller and obligor, marketing programs or claims related
to faulty goods. The reduction of the amount payable under a re-
ceivable may be permitted under the terms of the applicable loan
agreement or account but the result to an ABCP conduit is insuffi-
cient funds to pay maturing commercial paper. Dilution is ordinarily
covered by a covenant of the Seller in a Sale and Servicing Agree-
ment to reimburse the Vehicle for the amount of any dilutions. In
the event of a Seller's insolvency, however, this reimbursement obli-
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gation would not be fulfilled.
Preference risk is another problem stemming from Seller bank-
ruptcy. Payments made by a Seller to the Vehicle with respect to
dilutions or to cure breaches of representations and warranties with
respect to the receivables may be recovered by a bankruptcy trustee
if they were made within the applicable "preference" period prior to
the onset of the Seller's bankruptcy.
Credit risk, and to some extent dilution and preference risk, are
protected against by several mechanisms, both at the level of the
Seller as well as at the conduit level. A basic measure to protect
against losses on a conduit's assets is the concept of "eligible receiv-
ables." A conduit Vehicle will only purchase receivables that meet
defined criteria. Eligibility criteria attempt to exclude from a conduit
receivables that are likely not to pay in full. Important eligibility cri-
teria include requirements that a receivable: (i) is not defaulted at
the time it is acquired by the Vehicle; (ii) is not delinquent more than
a certain number of days (usually 120); (iii) is denominated in U.S.
dollars; and (iv) as to which the Seller has good title, free and clear of
all liens. If, after receivables are transferred to the Vehicle, it is de-
termined that a receivable is not an eligible receivable, the Seller
must repurchase the receivable from the Vehicle. The Seller also
makes a number of other representations and warranties to the Vehi-
cle in the Sale and Servicing Agreement as to the characteristics of
the receivables. A breach of any of those representations and war-
ranties will usually require a repurchase of the related receivable by
the Seller.
ABCP programs also guard against credit and related losses on
receivables by issuing commercial paper in an amount somewhat less
than the face amount of receivables transferred to the conduit. The
purchase price paid by the Vehicle for receivables is also, therefore,
proportionally less than the amount of receivables purchased. The
effect of this discounted advancing against receivables is to create
overcollateralization in the conduit. That is, the Vehicle will own a
greater face amount of receivables than it issues commercial paper.
Collections on this excess amount of receivables is available to pay
maturing commercial paper to the extent other receivables are not
collectible in full. The amount of discount is calculated to reflect the
probability of losses on the receivables. Generally, the discount is
tied to the level of historical losses on the receivables of a particular
Seller. The purchase price paid by a Vehicle to different Sellers in a
single conduit will vary, therefore, depending on the past perform-
ance of each Seller's receivables. The purchase price is often reset
1997]
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periodically to reflect losses experienced during a moving window of
time, extending a specified number of months prior to the date on
which the purchase price is reset.
B. Credit Enhancement
The most important form of protection against credit related
losses is the credit enhancement facility. Credit enhancement facili-
ties most frequently take the form of a letter of credit provided by a
bank or syndicate of banks which may include the Sponsor. Credit
enhancement may also be provided by cash-collateralized guarantees
from the Sponsor or by financial guarantee insurance policies issued
by monoline insurance companies. Early ABCP conduits sometimes
offered credit enhancement against 100% of the amount of commer-
cial paper issued; however, it is much more common recently to find
partial credit enhancement in the range of 10% to 15% of the maxi-
mum amount of commercial paper issuable by a conduit program.
The rating agencies establish the amount of credit enhancement re-
quired for a given conduit based on models of the expected timing
and severity of losses on the receivables. Their analyses take into
account the various credit risks of the receivables of each Seller and
the strength of each Seller's origination and servicing operations.
Credit enhancement facilities are contracted for by an ABCP Vehicle
for the benefit of all commercial paper holders, and can therefore be
used to cover losses on receivables of any Seller in the program.
C. Liquidity Facility
ABCP conduits typically obtain a liquidity facility to offset li-
quidity risks. As with credit enhancement, a liquidity facility is
provided by a bank or group of banks of which the Sponsor may be a
member. The size of liquidity support is most often equal to 100% of
the maximum amount of commercial paper issuable by the conduit.
Commonly, the size of the liquidity facility is equal to the difference
between the maximum program size and the amount of the credit
enhancement facility. A credit enhancement facility may also be
available for liquidity draws by the Vehicle after the liquidity facility
has been exhausted. The managing agent for a conduit Vehicle, usu-
ally the Sponsor or one of its affiliates, will draw on the liquidity
facility to repay maturing commercial paper on any day on which it is
not possible to issue new commercial paper in an amount that, when
combined with collections on hand with the Depositary, is sufficient
to pay such maturing commercial paper. The provider of the liquid-
ity provider is repaid collections on the receivables as they become
[Vol. 1
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available.
In multi-seller conduits, the liquidity facility may be at either the
Seller level or the program level. In the latter case, a single facility
provides liquidity support to the entire transaction, regardless of
which Seller's receivables have been slow to pay. In other ABCP
conduits, each Seller has the benefit of a dedicated liquidity facility
sized to cover the full amount of commercial paper issuable with re-
spect to such Seller's receivables.
IV. LEGAL ISSUES
The primary set of legal issues involved in ABCP securitization
revolve around bankruptcy. As indicated at the outset, a fundamen-
tal goal of any securitization is to isolate the assets being securitized
from a potential bankruptcy of the owner of those assets. Investors
in ABCP rely on, and the ratings assigned to ABCP depend upon, the
premise that repayment of ABCP will be determined by the per-
formance of the underlying assets and not on the financial
performance or business condition of the securitizer of those assets.2
Consequently, ABCP transactions are structured in a manner that
permits counsel to opine, so far as is possible, that the securitized as-
sets will not be involved in a bankruptcy of the Seller or the SPE.
The first step in making assets "remote" from a Seller bank-
ruptcy is to interpose a bankruptcy-resistant entity-the SPE-
between the Seller and the Vehicle. As noted above, the transfer of
assets in a typical conduit moves in two steps: from Seller to SPE and
from SPE to the conduit. The SPE is set up in a manner to make it
resistant to (i) being placed in bankruptcy and (ii) being drawn into a
bankruptcy of its parent, the Seller. The first goal is addressed by
limiting the corporate purposes of the SPE to activities related to se-
curitization, typically to acquiring and disposing of receivables, loans
or other financial assets. In addition, an SPE's articles of incorpora-
tion restrict its power to incur debt. Usually an SPE cannot incur any
debt unless it is nominal in amount, incidental to securitization and
fully subordinate to the SPE's obligations in a securitization. These
2. It is, of course, important that the Seller of assets into a securitization conduct
efficient servicing operations. But servicers can usually be replaced, and a servicer's fail-
ure should not impair the credit quality of the assets. Also, ratings of ABCP programs
rely heavily on the obligation of credit enhancement and liquidity providers to cover
losses and liquidity shortfalls.
3. This requirement has traditionally applied only to non-investment grade Sellers.
The introduction of FASB 125, however, has prompted investment grade Sellers as well
to adopt a two-tier structure.
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provisions are intended to minimize the possibility that the SPE will
create liabilities that could make it the subject of an involuntary
bankruptcy by creditors. Further, an SPE's articles will usually re-
quire that at least one member of the board of directors be
independent of the Seller or its affiliates and that such independent
director(s) consent be required for any voluntary bankruptcy filing by
the SPE. In this way, the possibility that a voluntary filing by the
SPE might be forced by the parent Seller is reduced.
In order to keep an SPE free of its parent's bankruptcy, an SPE
must operate in a way that observes corporate formalities, distinct
from the Seller. Such formalities include maintaining separate of-
fices, maintaining its own books and records, taking corporate action
by appropriate meetings and board resolutions and keeping the
SPE's finances separate from those of its parent.
Legal analysis of the risk that an SPE would be drawn into its
parent's bankruptcy is provided in a non-consolidation opinion of
counsel to the Seller. A non-consolidation opinion is a highly rea-
soned opinion, generally reaching the conclusion that a bankruptcy
court would not disregard the corporate separateness of the Seller
and its subsidiary SPE and order the assets of the SPE consolidated
with those of its bankrupt parent. This opinion can be difficult to
render, especially in the context of a securitization in which, despite
the formal separateness of Seller and SPE, the SPE is wholly owned
by the Seller and has no real existence apart from the parent's securi-
tization activities. Much depends on the particular facts of the
relationship between the Seller and the SPE. Counsel must evaluate
this relationship closely and advise the Seller how to structure the
SPE and its relationship to the Seller. These opinions will be re-
viewed closely by counsel to the rating agencies and must include
certain generally accepted lines of analysis.
A non-consolidation opinion reviews a number of factors which
case law shows courts tend to consider in deciding whether to order
the substantive consolidation of two entities. One set of factors con-
cerns the effect of such a consolidation on the creditors of each
entity. Relevant issues include whether (i) creditors of one entity
dealt with the two companies as a single economic unit;4 (ii) the two
entities are so entangled that the expense of separating them would
prevent creditors from recovering on their claims;5 and (iii) assets
4. See Soviero v. Franklin Nat'l Bank of Long Island, 328 F.2d 446, 448 (2d Cir.
1964); Stone v. Eacho, 128 F.2d 16 (4th Cir. 1942).
5. See In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988); Chemical Bank
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were transferred between the two companies without fair considera-
tion or with the intent to hinder or defraud creditors.' The other
main issue is the nature of the relationship between the two entities
to be consolidated. This analysis inquires whether one entity serves
as a more "instrumentality" or "alter ego" of the other and, further,
whether one entity has used the other as a "cloak of fraud" or has
otherwise created an abuse of creditors." In determining the question
of instrumentality, courts have viewed the following factors, among
others, as suggesting instrumentality: one corporation is the wholly
owned subsidiary of the other; the two entities have directors and of-
ficers in common; the parent finances the subsidiary; the subsidiary
has grossly inadequate capital; the subsidiary has substantially no
business except with the parent or no assets other than those trans-
ferred to it by its parent; the directors or officers of the subsidiary do
not act independently from the parent entity; and the two companies
do not observe the legal forms of two distinct corporations.'
Applying this analysis to the structure of an ABCP conduit, it is
difficult to conclude with certainty that a court would not consolidate
a Seller and its SPE. A court has many factors to weigh and has
broad discretion in using its equitable powers. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, there are virtually no cases directly analogous to a
securitization. Further, the relationship of a Seller and its financing
SPE often run afoul of some of the indicia of "mere instrumentality."
For example, it is common for an SPE to share officers or directors
with the parent Seller and for the SPE to effectively take direction
from the Seller, which has set up the SPE specifically to serve the
Seller's purpose of participating in a conduit securitization. Such an
SPE has little real business of its own apart from its dealings with its
parent.
In reaching the conclusion that a court, after a consideration of
the relationship between Seller and SPE and the relevant case law,
would hold that an SPE should not be consolidated with the bank-
ruptcy estate of its parent, counsel rely heavily on (i) the observance
New York Trust Co. v. Kheel, 369 F.2d 845, 847 (2d Cir. 1966); Matter of Lewellyn, 26
B.R. 246,251 (1982).
6. See Sampsell v. Imperial Paper Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 220 (1941); Maule Indus. v.
Gerstel, 232 F.2d 294,297 (5th Cir. 1956).
7. See Baker v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 180 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Henry
W. Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CAL. L. REv. 12,
17-20 (1925).
8. See Anaconda Building Materials Co. v. Newland, 336 F.2d 625, 627 (9th Cir.
1964); see also Fisser v. Int'l Bank, 282 F.2d 231,238 (2d Cir. 1960); Maule Indus. v. Ger-
stel, 232 F.2d 294, 297 (5th Cir. 1956); Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940).
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of corporate formalities by the SPE, (ii) structuring of the transac-
tions between Seller and SPE (primarily the sale and purchase of
assets) such that creditors of the Seller are not deceived as to the re-
lationship between the two entities or defrauded by the transfer of
assets and (iii) the fact that consolidation is an unusual step in bank-
ruptcy cases, requiring a strong showing that failure to consolidate
would constitute an abuse of creditors.
As a further bankruptcy safeguard, the rating agencies may re-
quire that Seller's counsel opine that the transfer of assets by the
Seller to the SPE should or would be viewed as a sale and not be re-
characterized by a bankruptcy court as a borrowing by the Seller
from the SPE secured by a pledge of the Seller's assets. Specifically,
a "true sale" opinion attempts to conclude that, subject to certain
qualifications, a bankruptcy court should or would: (i) find that the
assets conveyed by the Seller to the SPE are not part of the bank-
ruptcy estate of the Seller under Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code;
(fi) find that the transfer of the assets would not be subject to the stay
of Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code; and (iii) not compel the turn-
over of the assets to the Seller pursuant to Section 542 of the
Bankruptcy Code.
The factors analyzed in such an opinion include: (a) the business
objectives and intent of the parties, (b) the extent to which the Seller
retains any interest in the assets, such as the right to repurchase the
assets, (c) the level of recourse to the Seller for losses on the assets,
(d) the degree of control over the assets retained by the Seller, (e)
whether reasonably equivalent value was given by the SPE for the
assets, and (f) the extent and the nature of the parties' disclosure of
the transaction to third parties as a sale.9 In applying the factors to
the Seller-SPE transfer, a favorable true sale analysis relies on some
or all of the following: (i) the Receivables Purchase Agreement ex-
presses the intent of the parties that the transfer of assets be a sale,
(ii) the Seller retains only a limited right to repurchase assets and has
limited recourse on the assets; the Receivables Purchase Agreement
and the Sale and Servicing Agreement typically provide that the
Seller repurchase assets only in the instance of a breach of represen-
tation and warranty regarding the assets, and not because of credit
losses, and (iii) the Seller has little discretionary control over the as-
sets once they have been transferred into a securitization. The
9. See Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., Inc., 602 F.2d 538 (3d Cir.
1979); In re Joseph Kanner Hat Co., Inc., 482 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1973); In re O.P.M. Leas-
ing Services, Inc., 30 B.R. 642 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); Fox v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., Inc.,
25 B.R. 674 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982).
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agreements provide that the Seller relinquishes its rights to control
the assets other than to perform customary servicing activities, pri-
marily making collections on the receivables. Discretion on the part
of the Seller is minimized because these duties are constrained by the
terms of the Sale and Servicing Agreement. Also, the Seller per-
forms these functions not for its own account but as an agent of the
conduit Vehicle for the benefit of the commercial paper holders.
As with the requirement that the Seller's SPE be bankruptcy
remote, the rating agencies encourage protections against the conduit
Vehicle being drawn into a bankruptcy of any other entity, particu-
larly the Sponsor, or becoming the subject of its own bankruptcy
proceeding. The latter risk is addressed by incorporating in the Ve-
hicle's governing documents limitations on activities and
indebtedness and provision for independent directors like those used
in the articles of an SPE. The former issue is most often approached
by arranging for third party ownership of the Vehicle. Although the
Sponsor often directs the creation of an ABCP conduit and acts as its
managing agent, it will not own the SPE. A Sponsor can contract
with one of a number of companies in the securitization industry pro-
viding services as the owner of "orphan" subsidiaries.
Finally, as a backstop to the opinions supporting a sale charac-
terization of transfers of securitized assets by their Sellers and the
corporate separateness of Sellers and their SPEs, counsel must gen-
erally provide opinions (i) that an SPE has a first priority perfected
security interest in the assets transferred to it by the related Seller
and, in many cases, (ii) that the conduit Vehicle has a first priority
perfected security interest in the assets transferred to it by the SPEs.
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